1st Battalion 22nd Infantry LZ Valkyrie

1st Battalion 22nd Infantry

A Battalion Commander's Perspective on LZ Valkyrie

THOUGHTS ABOUT FIRE SUPPORT BASE VALKYRIE

By Colonel (R) Ron Rabin

It was my honor to command the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry (1/22 Inf) Regiment of the 2nd Brigade, 4th infantry division in the Republic Vietnam (RVN) from February until August of 1970. During that period the Battalion, also known as the “Regulars by God [1],” participated in the Cambodian Incursion of May 1970, as part of the 4th Infantry Division (4th ID). I named the Battalion fire support base (FSB) in Cambodia “Valkyrie.” For many years now, my friend, James Henderson [2], who was an M-79 Grenadier in Bravo Company of the 1/22 Inf (B/1/22) has nagged me to write about FSB Valkyrie (aka landing zone [LZ] Valkyrie) and the night it was attacked by some Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army enemy (NVA) soldiers. Today (11/1/2021) he delivered to me the account of B/1/22’s “Battle of the Rock” in August of 1970, so I thought I would reciprocate with this paper which explains how Valkyrie was named and established and my recollections of events when the “dinks[3]” had the temerity to attack us.

Much ado exists about the Cambodian Incursions that occurred during the Vietnam War, but for me, and I think for most of the soldiers in my Battalion, this was just another combat assault (CA) and search and destroy mission such as we routinely conducted during normal combat operations in highlands South Vietnam (the Republic of Vietnam). Of course, there was increased anxiety because the enemy might be stronger with an order of battle that included more North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and fewer Viet Cong (VC) units in the Cambodian area of operations (AO) than was the case in Republic of Vietnam (RVN); and there was wall-to-wall press coverage because of the size of the operation. In addition, there was a high level of command interest all the way to the Pentagon and the White House. But again, at the fighting unit level this was just another CA. I mean, you can only “pucker up” so much.

All is calm during pre-operation briefings to commanders. Brigade and division staff members give you your unit’s mission and present operations overlays describing the plan for how the coming battle will be conducted at brigade and division levels and you get to ask questions/make input. Operation overlays portray the operation graphically and contain enemy and friendly information; neat “goose eggs” drawn around key terrain objectives; and arrow-shaped axes of advance give you a visualization of the plan. In these briefings, the mission is clear, concise, complete, and usually very hazardous to your health. You hear about envelopments (end runs) and by-passing some danger areas. It all looks and sounds smooth and simple. However, to the rifleman at the squad and platoon level everything is a direct frontal assault executed in a dangerous, noisy, chaotic environment. The mission of the infantry was, is, and always should be to attack and close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to kill and or capture him (again, screw the PC nonsense about making friends - that takes both sides, and you don’t know about the other guy). With the basic mission done, the Infantry then prepares to continue the attack. BTW, I am thankful that I never had to put extra risks on my soldiers because of some dumb-assed rules of engagement (ROEs [4]). And so it was that the insertion of the 1/22 Infantry into its LZ/FSB in Cambodia was just another combat assault to us – except we had to move the whole battalion plus attachments by helicopter from pick-up zones near the village of Plei Me into Eastern Cambodia; and we had to do it in one day! In fact, moving the entire battalion in one day was unique and during my 6 months in command we only did it just twice. At times (4 or 5 during my time as Battalion C.O.), we moved the Battalion command post (CP)/tactical operations center (TOC), security company, artillery battery and support elements to establish a different fire support base (FSB); and other times we did a CA with one rifle company of the battalion at a time. And since I always rotated the rifle companies of the 1/22 Infantry every five days, we also extracted from LZs about once a week. What this meant was that on a rotation day we were doing one CA and one extraction about every five days. This required coordination and great staff work and my battalion staff and command group were absolutely the best in Vietnam. To my knowledge, because of their professionalism we had zero “screw ups” in any of these operations during my time with the Battalion.

(I am trying to keep this short, but for folks who have not “been there, done that” to understand the complexities and challenges involved in the Cambodian Incursion I believe it important to parse some of the information to help them understand. So, this paper is turning into an essay. My apologies.)

Moving the battalion FSB/LZ involved conducting a heliborne operation to redeploy the Battalion’s FSB which consisted of our tactical CP/TOC; artillery battery (C Battery, 4th Battalion, 42 Artillery (C/4/42) which had a long history of supporting the 1/22 Infantry); a FSB security company (one of our 4 rifle companies); and various support elements. At other times we either moved one of our rifle companies, or our 4.2 inch mortar platoon, or our Recon platoon, or a combination thereof. Since it was my standard operating procedure (SOP) to keep our surgeon and medical platoon and our Chaplain on our FSB, they as well moved with the FSB. Some operations were preplanned, others were quick response, and all were based on the enemy intelligence situation at the time. The 1/22 Inf table of organization and equipment (TOE) included a Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations (CA/PSYOPS) [5] that operated around the Battalion rear area near An Khe where our Battalion Executive Officer (XO) ran our Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). He had the unenviable task of keeping our administrative details, personnel, and logistics business in order and he did this with unbelievable skill and professionalism.

The next few paragraphs are included to provide information to readers who are less familiar with airmobile operations and the role of the FSB (including LZ Valkyrie,) in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations (aka “search and destroy” operations [6]) in the highlands of Vietnam.

The enemy situation and terrain of the Vietnam highlands dictated that our movements to contact were always heliborne operations. The ships that did the work were developed or modified to that purpose. The HU-1B (“Huey”) and CH-47 (“Chinook” or “Hook”) helicopters were the prime movers of our troops and equipment during combat assaults (BTW, the troops had another name for the “Hooks.”). The “Huey” came in three basic configurations: 1) “Slicks” for troop lift; 2) command and control (Charlie-Charlie) ships to help coordinate combat assault operations; and 3) “Guns” to provide suppressive fires. Some of the gunships were modified Hueys armed with a combination of rocket launchers, grenade launchers, and machine guns. Another Gunship was the AH-1 Cobra equipped with rockets or minigun pods and some had turret systems with 40mm grenade launcher and/or miniguns. My soldiers moved by “Slicks” accompanied by “Guns.” The “Hooks” primarily provided heavy lift (artillery, ammo, etc.) and at times were used to move troops. Personally, Hooks were not my favorite means for extracting from LZs, because they presented bigger targets and therefore were more vulnerable to enemy fire. As the Battalion Commander (Bn Cdr), I rode in a light observation helicopter (LOH or “Loach”) command and control (“Charlie-Charlie”) ship during combat assaults. Our artillery forward observer/liaison officer (FO/LNO) accompanied me on these forays. When we established a new FSB, there were also CH-54 “Cranes” to lift in mini bull dozers which were needed to prepare the area to include clear for observation and fields of fire to facilitate defensive operations. So much for the critical resources in the conduct of a CA.

During my time in command, the 1/22 Infantry, the conduct combat assaults (CAs), be they platoon or company size, were based on based on my combat experiences in the highlands,
in 1966 and 1969-70. Generally, the SOP went like this: 1) we received intel that there was enemy activity in our AO; 2) the decision was made as to conducting a CA or waiting for better targets; 3) if the decision was CA, then OPLANS were developed and coordination and reconnaissance with unit commanders begun to get the assets we needed; 4) I and my artillery LNO made a recon and selected multiple LZs in the vicinity of the enemy activity. We always “prepped” multiple LZs with artillery so as not to let the enemy know our exact intent. They might know we were coming, but not where; 5) we decided if we would CA our FSB security company and replace them, or if we would pick up a company in the field and move them. In either case we had to plan for one CA and two extracts on the same day; 6) we implanted the OPLAN. The CA went like this: Get me and my artillery LNO into a Charli-Charlie and enroute to the CA area; Get the troops loaded onto Hueys; coordinate rendezvous with gunships; Prep all alternate LZs with artillery fire; lift and shift the artillery prep; run in the gunships for continuous suppressive fires on tree lines of the LZ and insert the troops while suppressive fires continued. Once the CA unit was on the ground and the LZS secured, it was back to the FSB and get caught up on the total situation. Maybe have a “cold one”.

Just as we had an SOP for combat assaults, we also had one for when units were in contact with the enemy. Regardless of the size enemy and friendly forces involved, “Higher” [7] insisted that every enemy contact had to be supported by artillery and close air support (CAS) support (either USAF jets or Army gunships). I preferred gunships because they could hover in, make positive ID with us, and we could direct them in on the enemy. No friendly fire casualties with this positive ID and close coordination. To me, “Higher’s” CAS and artillery support SOP made sense in some situations, but not others. If the contact was with a large enemy force and a fairly prolonged firefight ensued, it made good sense. In fact it was the “school solution”. However, most of the contacts we made in the highlands were meeting engagements with small groups (5 or 6 enemy soldiers) and were of short duration (15-30 minutes). In these latter cases, if we took time to call in CAS and Artillery and establish the coordination necessary to avoid friendly fire incidents, the enemy was long gone before we could do the Infantry mission of closing with and destroying them. The other factor ignored by “Higher” (who I am sure was under their “Higher’s” pressure) was that by this SOP, they were not trusting the judgement of the leaders on the ground and not developing the battle commander skills they needed. My solution was simple and direct. If in my judgement the enemy contact was developing into platoon or larger size battle, we went by the book, developed the battlefield, and used all available firepower to defeat the enemy force in detail. If the contact was of the meeting engagement size, I let my leaders on the ground handle the situation and deliver any support they requested. Meanwhile, we at the 1/22 Tactical CP called in airstrikes on “suspected enemy locations” near the firefight; and placed artillery “blocking fires” on “suspected trails” the enemy could use to reinforce or retreat thus fulfilling “Higher’s” SOP. The best news is that there were no dumb rules of engagement (ROEs) to put my soldiers in danger while some desk dick in the Pentagon decided if they could shoot.

Back to FSB/LZ Valkyrie. In the U.S. military, all combat operations follow the same general process 12 step process: 1) You are given a mission; 2) Staffs and Subordinate units are alerted; 3) A tentative concept of operation is developed; 4) Preparations begin based on available information; 5) You conduct a reconnaissance and gather more information; 6) Staffs and subordinate commanders make recommendations; 7) The commander makes the final decisions[8] on all related issues; 8) Planning is completed; 9) Orders are issued; 10) The plan is executed; 11) The plan is adjusted based on the situation (no operation ever goes as planned); 12) You fight until the mission is accomplished, whereupon you do it all again with a new mission. So, when I received the warning order from brigade, that process kicked-in and we prepared to extract the Battalion from our current FSB and rifle company AOs and assemble at the brigade base in An Khe; to plan for the Cambodian operation; to conduct the combat assault into eastern Cambodia astride the Ho Chi Minh trail; and finally, to conduct search and destroy operations in our assigned AO. Like I said, my staff were great professional soldiers which allowed me to focus on the combat operations while they took care of the movement details and coordination.

While the 1/22 was redeploying to the 2nd Brigade rear area at An Khe, the staffs of the 4th ID and 2d Brigade were briefing myself and other subordinate commanders on the overall Cambodian Incursion plan. It was a complicated plan for a corps level operation requiring that several U.S. combat divisions and corps support elements (about 30,000 U.S. troops) go in quick, take care of business and get out. These briefings provided me with the operational information and intelligence needed to formulate my concept for accomplishing the Battalion mission which I presented to my staff and company commanders and supporting unit leaders, so they could start their planning and preparations. Unless you have been involved in an operation like this, there is no way to fully understand the gazillion things going on simultaneously and the rapidity with which events happen and come together. All that I have described so far occurred in less than 24 hours. (Note: We accomplished all this the old-fashioned way without computers and situation awareness technology! All we had was paper maps, acetate, grease pencils, and PRC-10 or AN/GRC 9 radios and, because of our training and experience, the ability to visualize the battle in 3-D)

After these briefings, it was time to catch a “Loach” from AN KHE to a rendezvous point with a “Huey” that would take me on a reconnaissance flight into my operational area in Cambodia to select a position for the Battalion FSB and get a feel for the terrain to complete my plan of action so that my staff and I could complete our Operations Plan (OPLAN). Part of the 1/22 mission was to complete our combat assault operations into Cambodia in a single day - not the easiest of things to do considering the number of pieces that had to fit together. This part of the mission required us to establish an operational FSB (including a security rifle company, artillery battery, commo, engineers, and medical platoon) in hostile territory and at the same time combat assault 4 rifle companies, our Recon Platoon and 4.2 inch mortar platoon into their operational areas. Fortunately, I had learned at the United States Army Infantry School and Ranger School that simple plans usually produce the best results (the old KISS rule) and, as a result, my reconnaissance of the 1/22 Infantry’s AO was brief to say the least. The reconnaissance ship took off from Plei Me, which was about 10 kilometers (“klicks”) from the border, quickly ascended to 5000 feet, and headed West into Cambodia (we had learned that 5000 feet of altitude or tree top level were effective in minimizing the effects of enemy ground fire). The weather was clear and in that area the terrain was relatively flat with rolling hills, so visibility was good to the horizon. The Battalion’s AO was about thirty “klicks” inside of Cambodia; therefore, it did not take long to arrive in that area and when we were about one kilometer out, I saw this very large open field that the locals had used to cultivate rice by the slash and burn method. (Slash-and-burn agriculture is often used by tropical-forest root-crop farmers in various parts of the world and by dry-rice cultivators of the forested hill country of Southeast Asia.) It was dry and obviously dusty as heck which was aggravating as hell once we began landing and operating the FSB there. But it was easily identifiable from about five klicks out so, even poor map readers could not miss it. In addition, there was no dominant high ground with jungle canopy nearby to hide enemy snipers or snoopers. It was perfect for my KISS plan. I marked the location on my map and to their surprise I ordered the Huey pilots to head back to our Battalion assembly area near Pleiku on the RVN side of the border. This entire recon took only about 40 minutes! (KISS also saves time)

With the decision regarding the Battalions’ FSB location made and having seen the terrain the simplest of plans took shape my mind. Upon my return to the assembly area, my staff and I settled down to complete our plans and briefings to the officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who would lead the 1/22’s rifle companies, artillery battery and other tactical “organics” the (Mortars, Medics, and Recon units) and our attachments, support units in preparation for our CA into Cambodia. The KISS solution went like this: First, CA the fire base security company (B/1/22) onto Valkyrie to clear and secure the area. Next, bring in the artillery so that they could immediately set up to support other elements of the battalion. Then came the commo attachments so essential for command and control. That done, we would bring the other rifle companies to Valkyrie which was already secured by B/1/22 and have them “hump the boonies” to their separate AOs. This was key to our being the only battalion in the 4th ID to get into Cambodia in one day, which was a mission requirement, because we only had to secure one FSB/LZ and that was Valkyrie. Other battalions had more complex insertion plans which required multiple LZs and much more time and resources.

On the 7th of May 1970 (9 days before my 38th birthday) it was time to move on to FSB/LZ Valkyrie. People have often asked why the 1/22 Infantry FSB in Cambodia was named Valkyrie. It was my doing and here is why. In Viking mythology, the Valkyrie were each of Odin’s twelve handmaidens who conducted slain warriors of their choice (the heroes) from the battlefield to Valhalla. Can you produce a more fitting name for an FSB in a combat zone in which my “Regulars” would engage in mortal combat with equally determined enemy warriors than a name with ties to some of the greatest warriors in history? This “naming” became sort of controversial, because this was at a time when the politicians, behavioral scientists and other “armchair quarterbacks” were trying to tone down the imagery of the first war America could see in near real time in their living rooms thanks to TV. In addition, other “experts” were pushing pacification programs and civil affairs/psychological operations (CA/PSYOPS). Of course, these and other factors precipitated “command influence” to tone down the names of operations and FSBs making them less war like. You tell me: How in the hell do you fight a war without being war like? C’Mon man! Like General George Patton said: “War is a bloody business, a killing business.” Yes, I was asked (told) to change the name of FSB Valkyrie. I said: “No!” So, Valkyrie remained the name of our FSB in Cambodia. And so does war remain a bloody business. As an aside, based on my observations as a professional soldier this, asinine concept of “winning hearts and minds” instead of winning battles and wars and, in the process, instituting nonsensical restrictive rules of engagement (ROEs) has become the rule (and a dumb one based on history) rather than the exception on our current battlefields. War with ROEs pose extra danger to soldiers and they are in enough danger to begin with. You cannot win a battle without fighting like your life depends on it – which it frequently does. Screw their hearts, the enemy’s minds will follow after you kick their butts. Ask modern Germany and Japan.

The plan did include two other insertions. We had learned and been admonished to always operate within range of artillery support which had about 10 kilometers of range for 360 degrees from the FSB. This was a good SOP. Therefore, my operational plans (OPLAN) always deployed the Battalion’s 4.2 inch mortars within range of our FSB artillery and able to fire in support of the FSB if needed. This extended our operational area and gave fire support when needed. The Recon Platoon would be operating on our Battalion boundaries to prevent surprises and so they were inserted to facilitate that mission.

So, after all of that the 1/22 Infantry OPLAN to execute its part in the Cambodian Incursion of early May 1970 was “locked and loaded”. On or about 5 or 6 May 1970, (I have no notes or records and it has been 50-plus years) we were trucked from our assembly area near Pleiku to our pickup zone (PZ) at a Special Forces operated Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp named Plei Djerang closer to the Cambodian Border from which we would implement step 10 of the process - execute the plan which we did on 7 May , and it was a success in that all the Battalion’s personnel and those of our attached/supporting units were safely on the ground. Our units out in the bush did have fire fights with the enemy and we lost Regulars soldiers but killed more of the enemy and captured a large amount of enemy equipment, some of which suggested we had over run an enemy field hospital. We cleared the area of NVA/VC enemy soldiers and disrupted the Ho Chi Minh Trail supplying the enemy forces to the South. All-in-all a successful foray. Except for two incidents presented later in this paper, I won’t comment on the details and tell war stories of these firefights and captured equipment simply because I have no firsthand knowledge, only memories of radio transmissions.

For the most part, during my time as C.O., except for occasional sniper fire there was not much enemy activity on our FSBs. There was one exception at Valkyrie that I will save for last. That does not mean some interesting incidents did not happen. Like a two gun section of 155 mm howitzers (Clint would probably call them “the most accurate artillery piece in the world”) with a fire direction team arriving unannounced and setting up on Valkyrie. One event that will ever remain in my memory occurred on our second day on Valkyrie. As I mentioned earlier, the slash and burn farming that created Valkyrie had created a dust bowl that would put America’s dust bowl of the 1930’s to shame. With helicopters laden with ammo and other supplies arriving at our LZ in seemingly endless procession, another serious problem arose. Unfortunately, water was not readily available on Valkyrie and sending soldiers out with 5 gallon cans and canteens was not a good solution from both a manpower and security standpoint. So, I called the 4th ID operations center requesting a 500 gallon water trailer. In their infinite wisdom the answer was the ammo and supplies were more mission critical. Think about it! What is more mission critical than soldiers with boots on the ground? I made repeated calls and got the same answer. Finally, I recognized the voice of one of the better Division G-3 Ops action officers who was a friend. At first, even he denied my request and my response was: “Be advised this LZ is closed.” My friend replied: “You can’t do that.” To which I said: “I just did.” Silence followed, but about 30 minutes later a “Hook” arrived with two 500 gallon water trailers sling loaded from its belly. BTW, in candor I must admit that there are rumors that I did tell the Division G-3 that the next helicopter to arrive sans water would be shot down. Of course, I would not have done that, but my friend told me in later years when we were back in the “land of the big PX,” he wasn’t 100% sure about that.

We all know that even the best of OPLANS must be revised once the battle is joined. As I said above, thanks to KISS the 1/22 Infantry was the only 4thy Division battalion to incur into Cambodia in one day. I believe this was a function the other battalions having more complex plans with multiple LZs. As a result, they had some units on the ground, some enroute, and were operating with heliborne command posts (CPs) which probably stressed their command and control capabilities. With our CP established at Valkyrie we had the commo assets to allowed us to monitor the operations of other battalions on the Division “push.” [9] While monitoring the Division net on the second day of the Incursion, we heard transmissions indicating that one of the rifle companies of another battalion (1/12 Infantry as I recall) operating in an area contiguous to our AO was in heavy contact. This action being nearby got our interest and we were following the fire fight. Suddenly, my interest and that of my staff increased exponentially when the Division G-3 placed that rifle company in a heavy fire fight under the operational control of the 1/22 Infantry. In other words, that company was now under my command therefore I was responsible for all that company did or failed to do, just as if it were a rifle company organic to the 1/22 Infantry. With the commo means of the day, it took a while to establish contact with that company and assume command. That done, I called Division for a helicopter to take me to the where that company was in a fire fight with a fairly sizeable enemy force. Division’s frustrating answer was an unsatisfactory: “wait, out”! Which, at times, translated to “get in line and we will get back to you.” Always have a backup plan. Because Valkyrie was large and easily identifiable, we were also being used as a helicopter rearm and refueling base for Division AO. The downside was the seemingly endless helicopters raising that red clay dust in amounts hazardous to our health. On this Particular day, the upside was that I might could hitch a ride to get an “eyes on” look at the situation facing my new rifle company. Within a few minutes, an air cavalry unit came in to rearm refuel and the troop commander agreed to take me to and land me at the site of the fire fight. So, I and my radio-telephone operator (RTO), the best in Vietnam, loaded up on a Huey, let the unit know we were enroute, and headed to the area of concern. The air cavalry troopers we were with “hosed down” an LZ and we landed near where the contact with the enemy was on-going and followed a security fire team to the company commander’s CP. The fire fight was quite intense, but the company commander had control of the situation and was doing all the right things in terms conducting the battle. (Ironically, this company commander worked in a unit I led in later years and went on to be one of the best battle simulation experts of the day [1980-90s].) One of the things I learned was that when a unit is well led and getting the job done, the best things to do are: Tell the leader on the ground he [10] is doing a great job; assure him you had his back; and let him know that all the resources I could muster and control were there to help if needed. All of this done, I fired a few rounds “down range” and found a ride back to Valkyrie.

Generally speaking, once on the ground in Cambodia the 1/22 Infantry’s soldiers were “humping the boonies” and operating in pretty much the same way they did in Vietnam. There was an uptick in enemy contact, but that was to be expected considering we were invading what had been a sanctuary of sorts for the NVA/VC and so there were more of them there. So, there were meeting engagements and fire firefights with the enemy, weapons and supply caches were captured/destroyed, enemy way points on “The Trail” disrupted, and even an enemy training area was destroyed.

It is difficult to judge the effects of this foray into Cambodia, but I am comfortable that from the big picture point-of-view, the U.S. Military effort it made a significant contribution to our victory in the Vietnam war. Let me say here and now that the losers in the Vietnam war were not the military, rather they were the same losers we have now, 50 years later – the politicians and government bureaucrats who to this day quit and fold in the middle of a clear win every time the going gets tough. In the macro sense, it is likely that if the U.S. Military had not won in Korea (alleged to be the “Forgotten War” by the revisionist historians) and in Vietnam (which the same revisionists want to call “The Unnecessary War”) the “Berlin Wall” and Soviet/world Communism would still be alive and well. We must remember that world communism was the real enemy all along. (BTW, revisionist history is the “poison pill” of America). It is beyond my ken to know the extent to which our Battalion’s efforts in Cambodia (and in Vietnam) affected all these larger picture outcomes. I do know that my soldiers and all who served in the Vietnam War were the best Army the USA ever fielded (yes, at least as good as WW II Army). Here is a summary written by SP4. James Henderson, 2nd platoon, B/1/22: “By the time 1-22 leaves Cambodia, after 7 days, totals are 17 US WIA, 3 US KIA. And 33 NVA KIA and an unimaginable number of weapons, amounts of equipment, bunkers and hootches. Thus ended, the 2nd week in May 1970.”

The “Regulars” of the 1/22 Infantry occupied and defended FSB Valkyrie for about a week (May 5th to 13th, 1970) while its rifle companies conducted successful search and destroy operations and interdicted the Ho Chi Minh Trail in its AO. We received word on the 12th of May that we would return to our AO in Vietnam the next day. However, we cannot do our “extract” from Valkyrie without a brief (?) description of the night the “dinks” attacked FSB Valkyrie. There is a detailed description of the action from the persons on the perimeter perspective on the 1/22 web page. It is true and accurate. What follows is how it went from the Battalion Commander’s perspective.

In our initial planning for the incursion, I selected B/1/22 to be the force to land and secure Valkyrie and set up its defense. This decision was based on Bravo’s performance in the field and my confidence that its C.O., Captain T.J. Tijerina, would get the job done. That decision proved correct as our perimeter was probed a couple of times, but not attacked because B/1/22’s aggressive response and patrolling of the perimeter. Upon receiving the order on 12 May that we would “Hotel Alpha” [11] back to Vietnam on the 13th, I issued warning orders to my commanders and the planning process was under way. It was not much different than a normal FSB relocation, but my commanders were admonished by me to take extra care because of the area we were in. An extra caution was issued to those on the fire base to have prone foxholes for sleeping on extract eve. Perimeter patrols on 12 May reported signs of enemy activity and during the early evening there was some sniper fire, movement, and noise. As it was with all activity this info was sent to my CP where radios and telephones were monitored 24/7 and messages recorded by my great Operations (S-3) and Intel (S-2) RTOs. Awake or asleep, I was immediately brought up to speed by these citizen soldiers who were remarkable at their jobs. At about midnight of 12/13 May, all was quiet, so I decided to catch a few ZZZs while I could. Then, about 2 or 3 hours later, KABOOM! The enemy decided to attack LZ Valkyrie. So, there I was in my boots and underwear seeing the predawn darkness light up in what looked like the “mad minute” at the Infantry School and receiving reports from Bravo company as to their situation and our artillery battery, C/4/42 Artillery was firing missions in support of other units. Close combat is chaos, especially in the dark. The main enemy attack was on our perimeter about 150-200 yards North Northeast of the Battalion CP/TOC (where I was). The “dinks” also probed the southern side, or at least did some recon by fire. As the reports came in, I realized that Captain Tijerina and his troops, while under heavy fire, were in full control. Because the Artillery was firing other support missions (about 700 rounds by C/4/42 alone), I was not aware until later that they had lowered some gun muzzles and fired off some flechette (beehive) rounds in support B/1/22’s defense. Of course, the TOC was in all hands mode answering and receiving messages from our organic and attached units, brigade, division and more. I was in and out of the TOC so that I could try to see or visualize the firefight and keep the entire battalion situation in my head (our heads and minds were our “situation awareness” terminals in 1970). At one point, I recall my closest RTO asking if I needed anything. So, I “bummed” a cigarette from him (I was a chain smoker then). My instinct was to go where the action was, but I knew and trusted that Tijerina had enough to do without me being there to add to their problems. All of this occurred about 50 years ago, and I have no written records of the action, but, by my recollection, enemy Sappers supported by 82mm mortars, machine guns, and RPGs tried unsuccessfully for about two hours to breach our perimeter and do major damage, but B/1/22 kicked their butts and defeated them. We found a few dead “dinks” on our barbed wire the next morning and one Sapper still had his explosives package on him. Because the enemy carried off their dead and wounded whenever possible, we can’t accurately estimate their casualties. We just know they were not successful in their attempt to breach the “Regulars” perimeter at FSB Valkyrie. Regrettably, we suffered one US KIA that night.

When dawn came the enemy faded into the jungle around Valkyrie and we did a “Hotel Alpha” move back to our AO North of An Khe. According to SP4. James Henderson: “By the time 1-22 leaves Cambodia, after 7 days, totals are 17 US WIA, 3 US KIA. And 33 NVA KIA [12] and an unimaginable amount of weapons, equipment, bunkers and hootches were captured/destroyed”

[1] The 1/22 Infantry gained the name “Regulars, by God” at the Battle of Chippewa, July 5th 1815. It was the bloodiest battle of the war of 1812, and it was the British Commander who gave us the name. Yes, we kicked their butts. [2] So as not to offend the many other great soldiers who served with me, James and his Company Commander, Colonel (RET) Gil Tijerina are the only persons I will mention in this paper. They were important to the events at LZ Valkyrie and representative millions of soldiers in that draft Army who answered the call and did a magnificent job in a very difficult combat environment. It was my honor to command these some of these patriots who fought and died for our freedoms and unalienable rights against the socialist forces of the day. Regrettably, due to the terrain and operating conditions I was never able to meet and thank all of them personally. The Battalion, Regiment, Army, and our Nation owe them much more than they or their families received. If any Regulars or members of C/4/42 Artillery read this: Thank you for your service and thanks for the honor of being your “Old Man”. [3] “Dinks” was an appellation we used to identify/describe our enemy. Not PC, but no apologies. [4] The stupidity of rules of engagement (ROEs) and wokeness in the military.is so antithetical to good warfighting that it would take an entire book to adequately address it. [5] I have no quarrel with CA/PSYOPS units being in our organizational TOEs or with their hearts and minds mission. I just think that they should be employed after the battles are won and victory assured. The model for war is WW II. Unconditional surrender of or enemy must precede the “hearts and minds”. [6] Some may find the term “search and destroy” objectionable. War is war. Guaranteed the VC/NVA forces we fought were searching to find and destroy us, too. Again, “hearts and minds” are not won on the battlefield. [7] “Higher” was a common appellation for any headquarters higher than ours. Brigade, Division, Corps, etc. [8] Decision making is not a group function. The Commander is responsible for all the unit does or fails to do and has the right and responsibility to decide. Group decisions are invariably suboptimized by compromise. [9] G.I. slang for communications network probably derived from the fact that to transmit the operator had to push the button to activate the transmissions. [10] In my Army and in my time, Infantry leaders were “he” and “him”. The discussion on the current woke Army, equity, diversity , and political correctness can be had at another time, but not in this little essay. [11] “Hotel Alpha” was the radio-telephone phonetic for HA and was our way of saying: “haul ass”. [12] We can’t estimate enemy WIAs because they were usually carried off the battlefield. Also, the KIA count is probably low because some carried off probably died of wounds. I’m not a fan of body counts but that was the metric of the day.

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